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Abstract 
This article builds on the literature on policy failure and blame management to analyse the 
implementation of large-scale public projects, which frequently suffer from cost overruns and 
delays. The article addresses a hitherto neglected blame management strategy used by 
politicians overseeing implementation: the stepwise announcement of delays and/or cost 
overruns, often referred to as ‘salami tactics’. I assert that politicians apply salami tactics in 
order to reduce and deflect the blame for a project that turns out to be more expensive, or takes 
longer to complete, than initially communicated. The empirical section examines the use of 
salami tactics in two large-scale public projects that resulted in delays and cost overruns: the 
Berlin Brandenburg Airport in Germany and the Swiss National Exposition Expo.02. Both 
cases confirm my arguments regarding the blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects of 
salami tactics and reveal that this strategy can cause projects to lock-in on a self-undermining 
path.  
Keywords 
Blame avoidance, blame management, framing contests, policy failure, policy 
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Introduction 
Research shows that blame management adopted by reputation-sensitive politicians has 
implications for the trajectory of public policies (e.g. Boin et al. 2009; Weaver 1986; 
McConnell 2017). This article contributes to this literature by examining political blame 
management during the implementation of large-scale public projects. Transport infrastructure, 
public buildings, IT and defence projects often end up being more expensive than expected, 
take longer to complete or are less beneficial to society than projected (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; 
van Marrewijk et al. 2008). I focus on two aspects of large-scale public projects which, to date, 
have not received enough attention in the literature: the politics that surround the 
implementation of large-scale public projects and, in particular, the strategies that politicians 
apply in order to defend overoptimistic projects during implementation.  
Drawing on concepts from the literature on blame avoidance and blame management (Weaver 
1986; Hood 2011; Hinterleitner 2017), I provide the first systematic account of a widely 
observed, but hitherto neglected, behavioural phenomenon among politicians responsible for 
large-scale public projects: the stepwise announcement of delays and/or cost overruns, 
frequently referred to by political opponents and the media as ‘salami tactics’ (e.g. Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2002, 281).1 By communicating delays or cost overruns in stages during the implementation 
phase, instead of comprehensively assessing and communicating them as soon as possible, 
politicians partition blame into smaller, more easily manageable, parts. Moreover, politicians 
can more credibly shift responsibility for delays or cost overruns onto project contractors if the 
announced delays or cost overruns do not appear to be too severe. Salami tactics are highly 
consequential for the fate of individual projects and for the allocation of public resources. By 
delaying the revelation of a project’s real benefit-cost ratio (BCR), salami tactics prevent 
                                                          
1 I thank Tobias Arnold for pointing me to this phenomenon. 
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adaptations and readjustments in the early stages of the implementation phase that could save 
public resources.  
This article proceeds as follows. After providing a short overview of the various drivers of 
overoptimistic forecasts, I conceptualise the implementation phase of an overoptimistic public 
project as a political ‘framing contest’ about the public perception of that project (Boin et al. 
2009). In the course of this framing contest, the politician(s) responsible for the project must 
engage in blame management in order to save the project from becoming a perceived policy 
failure. I then claim that using salami tactics is a strategy that serves this purpose. The empirical 
section examines the application of salami tactics during the implementation of two large-scale 
public projects that experienced significant delays and cost overruns: the Berlin Brandenburg 
Airport in Germany and the Swiss National Exposition Expo.02. The analysis confirms that in 
both cases, politicians applied salami tactics in order to manage the blame that emerged when 
it became clear that the respective projects could not be completed on time and within the 
budget. The cases further reveal that salami tactics prolong the resolution of underlying 
problems and can lead to significant extra costs and delays. After discussing the findings from 
the cases, I recommend that in future research scholars combine the study of policy failures 
with the blame management perspective in order to further elucidate the implementation of 
large-scale public policy projects. 
 
The role of salami tactics in the framing contests of overoptimistic projects 
Large-scale public projects often end up being more expensive than expected, take longer to 
complete or are less beneficial to society than projected. The literature discusses a number of 
reasons why large-scale public projects are frequently based on overoptimistic forecasts 
(Jennings 2012; Sanderson 2012; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). Technical explanations attribute 
forecasting errors to the complexities and uncertainties inherent in every large-scale project. 
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During implementation, complex projects often encounter difficulties that the original BCR did 
not consider.  
Psychological explanations apply concepts of bounded rationality, such as the ‘optimism bias’, 
to explain overoptimistic forecasts (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003). The literature suggests that 
project planners and politicians in charge of a planned project frequently develop overoptimistic 
beliefs about the positive aspects and the feasibility of the project and are therefore susceptible 
to communicating ‘inflated’ BCRs to the public. 
Finally, political explanations attribute overoptimistic forecasts to ‘strategic misrepresentation’ 
on the part of prospective project contractors and politicians. Given the high level of 
contestability of information during the project planning phase, the actors involved have the 
opportunity to present this information according to their interests. Namely, project contractors 
deliberately propose overoptimistic forecasts on costs, benefits and conversion times because 
doing so serves their economic self-interest. If these project contractors present their proposals 
favourably, their chance of acceptance rises. Political actors, such as state governments, 
departments or individual politicians are considered to be eager to accept the overoptimistic 
project estimates presented by contractors since they increase the public acceptance of the 
project and increase the likelihood of project approval (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002). Although 
scholars are continuously debating the relative causal weight of the drivers of overoptimistic 
forecasts (Jennings 2012; van Marrewijk et al. 2008), they widely consider political 
explanations to be an important driver. 
An overoptimistic or ‘inflated’ BCR unavoidably diminishes during the implementation of the 
project when it becomes clear that the project cannot be completed as promised. In the course 
of this process, the project begins to appear in a less favourable light. If the BCR diminishes, 
more and more parties will begin to argue that maintaining the project is not worth paying an 
additional price, that it cannot be waited for any longer, or that it can no longer be considered 
as a success given that the promised benefits will not materialise. As a result, a political 
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‘framing contest’ begins. During such a contest, political actors and the media struggle to 
anchor an updated perception of the project in the public’s mind that takes into account the 
diminished BCR (Boin et al. 2009). The dominant public perception that results from the 
framing contest can be expected to fall within ‘a spectrum from success to failure’ (McConnell 
2011, 71),  i.e. from a still favourable perception of the project to a very negative perception of 
it as an outright fiasco or disaster. Conceptualising the implementation phase of overoptimistic 
projects as a framing contest acknowledges that not only the decision-making phase leading up 
to their adoption is a political process, their implementation is as well. 
Public projects based on overoptimistic forecasts are a problem for the politician(s) overseeing 
the implementation of these projects. In the course of the framing contest about an 
overoptimistic project, the politician(s) responsible receive(s) blame from political opponents, 
the media and the public. Political opponents are especially likely to attempt to exploit delayed 
or over expensive public projects and to use them as ‘blaming opportunities’ (Boin et al. 2009). 
They can accuse the politicians in charge of having accepted an overoptimistic forecast in the 
first place (if they were already in office at the time of project approval), of not having 
intervened earlier or of not being honest to the public about the ‘real’ BCR of the project. The 
politicians in charge of overseeing implementation are very likely to perceive such accusations 
as a threat to their reputation (Hinterleitner and Sager 2018). This is especially true when a 
delayed or costly project turns into a ‘focusing event’, with political opponents successfully 
portraying it as a policy fiasco or disaster, in which accusations and blame often become 
uncontrollable and dangerous for the politicians in charge (Birkland 1998; Hood et al. 2009; 
Bovens and 't Hart 1996). To limit their negative effects, politicians must engage in the framing 
contest about the public project and take measures to prevent it from being perceived as a clear 
instance of policy failure.  
How can this be done? Blame attacks consist of two elements: They combine an emphasis on 
loss or harm with an assignment of responsibility for that loss or harm (Hood 2011). Hence, in 
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order to fend off the blame attacks from political opponents and the media, politicians must 
address both elements. They must decrease the perceived salience of announced delays or cost 
overruns and deflect the perceived responsibility for delays or cost overruns onto other actors 
involved in the implementation of the project (Hinterleitner and Sager 2017). I assert that the 
deliberate stepwise announcement of delays and/or cost overruns, frequently referred to as 
‘salami tactics’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002, 281), addresses both elements of blame attacks. First, if 
delays or cost overruns are communicated in stages, the perceived loss at any one time is 
smaller. For instance, an announced delay of one year weighs less than an announced delay of 
three years. Smaller losses appear less salient to the public and thus attract less blame from the 
media and from political opponents (Pal and Weaver 2003). Consequently, salami tactics make 
it easier for politicians to still eventually portray a delayed or over expensive project as an 
overall policy success. I thus expect that: 
E1: The use of salami tactics decreases the perceived losses associated with a project 
whose BCR is diminishing. 
Second, smaller delays or cost overruns should not only attract less blame, they should also be 
easier to blame on project contractors and to be portrayed as cases of misinformation. The more 
serious the delays or cost overruns, the less credible it is for the politician to claim that he was 
misled and was unaware about the misrepresentation in the first place. If cost overruns and 
delays are significant, it is much less likely that political opponents and the media will believe 
the blame-shifting move of the politician. Instead, they will inquire as to why the politician was 
prepared to believe an utterly unrealistic forecast in the first place. Hence, I expect that: 
E2: The use of salami tactics decreases the perceived responsibility of (a) politician(s) 
for a project whose BCR is diminishing. 
Taken together, I perceive salami tactics as a blame management strategy in the tug-of-war over 
the public perception of a project. Salami tactics facilitate the management of the blame that 
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emerges as a project’s BCR diminishes and helps to ward off reputational damage by keeping 
the project in the ‘success zone’ of perceived policy outcomes (Bovens and ‘t Hart 2016; 
McConnell 2010). Figure 1 summarises my conceptualisation of the implementation phase of 
overoptimistic projects, as well as the role of salami tactics in saving the project from becoming 
a perceived policy fiasco during this phase.   
 
Figure 1. The role of salami tactics during the implementation of overoptimistic projects 
 
 
Research design 
In the following section, I test the blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects of the use of 
salami tactics and explore their consequences on the implementation of two large-scale public 
projects that experienced significant delays and cost overruns. The Berlin Brandenburg Airport 
(BER) in Germany and the Swiss National Exposition Expo.02 were selected based on two case 
selection criteria, which together provide “the kind of control and variation required by the 
research problem” (George and Bennett 2005, 83; for a similar research design, see Weaver 
2014). First, both cases were verifiably based on BCRs that were already overoptimistic at the 
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time of project approval. This is not a precondition for the use of salami tactics, as politicians 
can also use these tactics to address technical problems that inadvertently arise during 
implementation. However, the more optimism that is built into an initial forecast, the more 
blame will emerge during the implementation phase and, accordingly, the greater the need for 
blame management. This makes the cases suitable for exploring the use of salami tactics and 
testing their blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects. Second, the two cases are very 
different in terms of project type and political contexts, and they reveal two different variants 
of salami tactics. The logic of the ‘most different’ case design serves two purposes. First, the 
differences between the cases can be leveraged to create additional insights on the concrete 
shape, applicability and consequences of salami tactics. Second, uncovering evidence for salami 
tactics in two very different cases increases the likelihood that they are indeed a widespread 
behavioural phenomenon that occur during the implementation of public projects. Table A1 in 
the Online Appendix provides a systematic overview of the case selection criteria and their 
purposes in light of the present analysis. 
When examining the use of salami tactics, the empirical challenge is to show that stepwise 
announcements are actually made by a politician who announces opening dates or cost 
estimates that deliberately go against his better judgement. After all, stepwise announcements 
can also be made by a politician who announces opening dates or cost estimates to the best of 
his knowledge. To empirically differentiate between these alternative explanations for stepwise 
announcements, I specifically focus on the level of information that the politician responsible 
for the project possesses when he announces a delay or cost overrun. If I can demonstrate that 
the politician possessed specific information, but withheld or deliberately ignored it when 
announcing an opening date or cost estimate, I interpret it as a form of salami tactics.  
Since it is often difficult to provide strong evidence that unequivocally confirms the use of 
salami tactics (on this see below), the analysis combines evidence drawn from a vast volume of 
qualitative data: transcripts of parliamentary debates, media coverage of both cases, official 
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reports by inquiry commissions and expert reports. Table A2 in the Online Appendix provides 
an overview of the main data and their primary uses. I systematically coded data with NVivo 
11, which allows for the extraction of information from large quantities of text and its allocation 
to several research-specific ‘nodes’. First, I coded the public statements of the politicians in 
charge and those of their political opponents. This allowed me to assess whether politicians 
made step-wise announcements during the implementation of the project, how they justified 
them and how political opponents reacted to them. Examining both the justifications of the 
politicians in charge and the reactions of their political opponents allowed me to test the blame-
reducing and blame-deflecting effects of step-wise announcements. Second, I extracted 
information from official reports to gauge the level of information that the politicians in charge 
possessed when announcing cost overruns or delays. 
Following a short case description, I first demonstrate that the project was adopted based on an 
overoptimistic project forecast. I then show that stepwise announcements were the result of 
salami tactics and not just a consequence of developments unforeseen by the politician. 
Subsequently, I test the expectations formulated in the theory section about the blame-reducing 
and blame-deflecting effects of salami tactics. The final analytical step proceeds in an 
explorative manner to assess whether salami tactics affect cost development, completion time 
and the coming to terms with underlying problems. 
 
Salami tactics during the construction of the Berlin Brandenburg Airport in 
Germany 
Following German reunification, political discussions began regarding the creation of a modern 
hub airport in the former eastern German territory. Proponents of the new airport expected it to 
replace the three small existing airports of Tempelhof, Tegel and Schönefeld. Berlin and the 
State of Brandenburg, in cooperation with the federal government, decided to build the new 
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hub at the site of the former Schönefeld airport close to the city of Berlin. After a failed attempt 
in 1999 to tender the project concession to a private contractor, the three shareholders decided 
to build the airport under the aegis of a public holding. When construction began in September 
2006, estimated costs were quoted at 2.1 billion Euros, with the airport scheduled to open in 
October 2011. 
In June 2010, the Mayor of Berlin, who was also the chairman of the board of the public holding 
(the politician responsible for the implementation of the project), surprised the public by 
announcing that the opening of the airport would be postponed from October 2011 to June 2012. 
He justified this decision by citing the unanticipated bankruptcy of a construction planning 
company and the stricter safety requirements mandated by the European Union, which had to 
be incorporated into the construction process. The delay, communicated in June 2010, was the 
first of a total of five postponements that the mayor announced from 2010 until 2014, when 
growing political pressure and blame forced him to resign. At the time of writing (September 
2018), the scheduled airport opening date is 2020, at the earliest, with costs expecting to exceed 
7 billion Euros by its completion. From 2010 to 2014, political opponents often criticised the 
mayor for standing by an announced opening date even after compliance with that date had 
become factually impossible and for too readily announcing the next optimistic opening date. 
This behaviour nurtured the suspicion that the mayor made these precipitant announcements in 
order to assuage public outrage. 
An inflated BCR  
In this case, the mayor not only endorsed an overly optimistic project forecast, but he also 
actively reached out for one. When the three shareholders first attempted to tender the project 
in 1999, they only received offers that were far too costly to ensure the swift approval of the 
project by the parliaments and populations of the two notoriously cash-strapped German federal 
states. They therefore announced that they would build the airport ‘cheaper and better’ than any 
private contractor could (Hoffmann 2012). Experts widely agree that the project plan that the 
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public holding used to begin building the airport was far too optimistic in several regards. 
Capacity estimates were set at the lowest possible level in order to downplay the problem of 
fly-over noise in the surrounding areas (Hoffmann 2012). Investment in noise control measures, 
an unavoidable expense for an airport built so close to the city centre, were estimated at an 
unrealistically low level (Fülling 2014). In sum, the mayor revealed a clear preference for an 
overoptimistic project forecast instead of obtaining estimates that were as accurate as possible, 
thereby laying the groundwork for an implementation phase in which the inflated BCR 
unavoidably had to diminish. 
The use of salami tactics  
There is considerable evidence that the mayor hastily announced a new opening date when he 
faced blame for an unmet one, without being able to base the new opening date on reliable 
information. This pattern is particularly visible in May 2012, when the June 2012 opening was 
cancelled at short notice. The opposition and media subsequently blamed the mayor for not 
having communicated the second postponement earlier. In response, he claimed that the 
management had not adequately informed him about the further delay. The ensuing court ruling 
(Berlin Regional Court 2014) reveals that the mayor must have known about the problems that 
led to the second postponement before May 2012 and thus could not have been surprised by 
this outcome. It also shows that the mayor announced the new estimated opening date of March 
2013, which he announced immediately after a board meeting in May 2012, against better 
judgement. Shortly before this board meeting, the executing companies informed the mayor 
that they were unable to guarantee a binding opening date unless they could solve some crucial 
construction process problems (Berlin Regional Court 2014). Despite these significant 
restrictions, the new estimated opening date was set for March 2013, and the mayor, when 
publicly expressing his confidence in the new opening date, made no mention of the 
considerable uncertainties related to this date (Berlin House of Representatives [BHoR] 2012a, 
1002–1007, 2012b). 
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Just how unfounded the March 2013 date was became clear four months later when the mayor 
announced the third postponement, this time from March 2013 to September 2013. Following 
the announcement of the second postponement, the board had replaced the chief planner in 
charge of coordinating the implementation phase. When parliament forced the mayor to justify 
the third delay, he announced that only then, after a four month settling-in period of the new 
chief planner, did the board possess an accurate overview of the situation and could thus 
confidently announce September 2013 as a new ‘realistic’ opening date (BHoR 2012d, 1553–
1554). This statement indirectly reveals that back in May 2012, the mayor did not have enough 
reliable information at his disposal to realistically announce the March 2013 date. In sum, there 
is considerable evidence that the mayor did not announce opening dates to the best of his 
knowledge but rather applied salami tactics in order to prevent the project from turning into a 
perceived policy fiasco. 
The blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects of salami tactics 
The use of salami tactics helped the mayor to reduce the blame that emerged when the 
overoptimistic BCR of the planned airport was diminishing. The announcement of an opening 
date in the very near future allowed the mayor to continue to frame the whole airport project as 
an overall policy success, from which the region would greatly benefit after completion (e.g. 
BHoR 2012a, 1005). As the mayor repeatedly stated, short delays of only a few months should 
not be used by an obstructive opposition to tarnish the overall success of the project. It is 
immediately obvious that the credibility of such justifications depends on a delay that does not 
weigh too heavily on the overall impression of a successful project. Even after this strategy lost 
effectiveness during later postponements, short delay announcements still allowed the mayor 
to make morale-boosting statements that it would not be long before the airport would open and 
become a huge success (e.g. BHoR 2012d, 1553). 
Second, the application of salami tactics also allowed the mayor to more credibly deflect blame 
onto other actors involved in the construction of the airport. Each delay was justified by a 
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specific (usually technical) problem, ranging from the bankruptcy of a planning company, to 
stricter EU safety requirements, to an inoperable fire protection system. By tying every 
postponement to a specific, unforeseen problem, the mayor was able, for quite some time, to 
shift attention away from the underlying fact that the airport project had always been based on 
an unrealistic project plan. During later rounds of the protracted framing contest, the mayor 
repeatedly deflected blame to the management of the holding (e.g. BHoR 2013, 2249). The 
success of the mayor’s blame management efforts can be read from the blaming patterns of 
political opponents. During the early phase of the implementation, opponents primarily directed 
their blaming efforts at the management of the holding and not at the mayor (e.g. BHoR 2012e). 
This only changed in August 2012, when rumours about a third delay put the mayor under 
increasing pressure (BHoR 2012c). Overall, there is considerable evidence that salami tactics 
helped the mayor to downplay perceived losses and to decrease his perceived responsibility for 
the delays for quite some time. 
Project consequences  
The consequences for the implementation of the airport project that emanated from salami 
tactics become obvious when we consider the costly acceleration efforts that companies adopted 
to somehow meet the newly announced, overambitious opening dates. To make up for previous 
‘delays’, companies often worked overtime and added extra shifts. Work stages, originally 
planned to be handled sequentially, began to be executed concurrently, increasing the planning 
effort and the likelihood of costly mistakes (Kurpjuweit and Tretbar 2014; Berlin Regional 
Court 2014). Moreover, the recurrent firing of managers in response to unmet opening dates 
also led to the loss of know-how during the implementation phase. At the political level, the 
use of salami tactics long prohibited a thorough examination of the manifold problems at the 
root of the original project proposal. By continuously suggesting that the opening of the airport 
was within reach, the mayor kept the perceived loss tolerable for too long. 
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Salami tactics during the preparation of the Swiss National Exposition 
Expo.02 
In the 1990s, a political discussion began about holding a new national exposition in 
Switzerland. After several cantons and cities submitted their applications, Switzerland’s 
collective executive government, the Federal Council (FC; the political actor responsible for 
the implementation of the project), decided to hold a national exposition (Expo.02) in the region 
of the three lakes of Neuchâtel, Biel and Murten in 2001 (Rieder et al. 2004). It subsequently 
requested a detailed feasibility study from the “Verein Landesausstellung” (hereafter Verein), 
which was responsible for the planning, construction and operation of Expo.02. This feasibility 
study concluded that it was possible to hold Expo.02 in the three-lakes region and that the 
financial contribution required from the federal state would amount to 170 million Swiss Francs 
(Rieder et al. 2004).  
When it became clear, in the summer of 1999, that Expo.02 could not be carried out with an 
initial federal contribution of 130 million Swiss francs and that the project was on the brink of 
failure, thus threatening to embarrass the FC, the latter increased the federal contribution in a 
piecemeal manner. Leading up to the delayed realisation of Expo.02 in 2002, the parliament 
rubber-stamped a total of five additional financing requests from the FC. In the end, the total 
federal contribution amounted to 928 million Swiss Francs. These acts of approval were 
accompanied by an increasingly outraged parliament (National Council 1999). It blamed the 
FC for holding on to an exposition that was not worth the higher price and for presenting the 
parliament with an overmodest financing request while already covertly preparing the next one 
(Council of States 2001). Unsurprisingly, the FC repeatedly reassured the parliament that each 
new contribution was necessary due to unexpected developments and would be the last one. 
An inflated BCR   
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Several reasons suggest that the FC endorsed the project based on overoptimistic assumptions. 
Even though the feasibility study submitted by the Verein mentions the private sponsorship 
potential of the exposition, an essential item in the feasibility study since private contributions 
would ultimately determine the financing deficit to be bridged by the FC, it did not consult 
potential sponsors (Swiss Federal Audit Office 2005, 39). Only five pages of the 1500 page 
feasibility study dealt with private sponsoring issues: in the final publication, this section was 
condensed into only two pages, without justifying the assumptions made. In general, the 
feasibility study can be seen as a mere pro forma document in whose quality the FC was not 
much interested. After all, the FC had already made its decision on the location before 
commissioning the feasibility study.  
When approving the feasibility study, the FC not only confirmed the estimated federal 
contribution of 170 million Swiss Francs, but it reduced it even further to 130 million Swiss 
Francs. The FC’s clear choice of an overoptimistic forecast can be explained by the dilemma it 
found itself in when deciding about Expo.02. On one hand, there was a broad public and 
political majority that wanted the FC to endorse Expo.02. On the other hand, the FC faced a 
tight federal budget and general scepticism towards huge statist interventions (Rais and 
Ammann 2013). When justifying the 130 million Swiss francs, the FC clarified that there would 
not be any further contributions (NZZ 2005). In short, the federal contribution, which 
parliament approved in December 1996, was not based on a ‘realistic’ estimate but on 
overoptimistic calculations, which unavoidably would have to be corrected by the opening of 
Expo.02. 
The use of salami tactics  
Several motivations lead me to argue that the five additional contributions cannot solely be 
explained by unforeseeable developments and that the reproaches made by parliamentarians 
about the use of salami tactics are at least partially justified. As previously outlined, after the 
FC made the decision about the location and initial investments, it had to proceed with Expo.02, 
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since terminating it would have been hugely embarrassing and would have resulted in high sunk 
costs. This must be borne in mind when considering that the FC refrained from conducting a 
comprehensive plausibility probe of all financing assumptions, even after a report published in 
September 1999 had made it clear that the estimates about future revenues and expenses were 
overoptimistic (Hayek-Engineering 1999). Among these, the estimate of contributions from 
private sponsors to the Expo was the most crucial. From 1996 until the actual date of the 
exposition, the FC consistently ignored expert advice and clung to utterly unrealistic third-party 
contribution forecasts (Swiss Federal Audit Office 2005, 90). According to the evaluation by 
the Control Committee of the Council of States (2001), the Swiss parliament’s second chamber, 
from April 1999 on, the FC could have easily realised that its assumption was hugely 
overoptimistic. So, while there is no definitive proof that the FC actively disregarded 
information, it nevertheless acted according to the maxim, ‘What I don’t know, won’t hurt me’, 
sticking to the estimates of the Verein for as long as possible, despite ever more overwhelming 
proof of overoptimistic forecasts. 
The blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects of salami tactics 
For the FC, this strategy paid off. The use of salami tactics allowed the FC to downplay the 
perceived loss by framing the whole project in positive terms such that, despite the need for 
further financing, it was still worth the (additional) price. Once, the FC explicitly labelled 
Expo.02 as a ‘limited debacle’, and it called the management problems that had caused the 
delays a ‘salutary crisis’ that finally allowed the FC to intervene and set things right (BAZ 
1999). In an explanation to parliament, the FC framed an additional contribution as a ‘positive 
sign’ that allowed the Verein to continue with the project (Federal Council 1999). This framing 
strategy would obviously not have been credible, but rather downright brazen, had the FC gone 
over the books more thoroughly and requested a correspondingly larger sum as early as October 
1999, when the framing contest intensified for the first time. The growing number of ‘no votes’ 
by parliamentarians for the various additional financing requests suggests that the application 
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of salami tactics helped the FC to keep blame at a tolerable level until the debate surrounding 
the fifth financing request. While the first four financing requests received a maximum of 39 
‘no votes’, the fifth financing request received 54 ‘no votes’ and numerous abstentions (with 
118 affirmative votes) (Swiss Federal Audit Office 2005, 26). This indicates that salami tactics 
helped the FC to avoid parliament’s termination of Expo.02 – an outcome that would have 
redounded onto the FC as the politically responsible patron.  
Second, salami tactics also helped the FC maintain the perception that the Verein was primarily 
responsible for the cost overruns. When justifying an additional contribution before parliament, 
the FC repeatedly deflected blame for cost overruns by accusing the Verein of badly managing 
Expo.02, thereby distracting from its responsibility for having accepted overoptimistic forecasts 
in the first place (BAZ 1999). The parliament long accepted the FC’s assignment of 
responsibility and primarily blamed the Verein for the waste of public money (Rieder et al. 
2004, 131). Only in spring 2002, on the occasion of the fifth financing request, did 
parliamentarians start to intensively blame the FC for hijacking parliament (Swiss Federal Audit 
Office 2005, 26–27). Overall, the use of salami tactics facilitated the reduction and deflection 
of blame during the framing contest about the perception of Expo.02. 
Project consequences  
The consequences of the use of salami tactics in the case of Expo.02 are mainly of a political 
nature. They allowed the FC to remove the parliament’s control function during the 
implementation phase. Having accepted modest financing requests in the beginning, the 
parliament had to grudgingly accept further contributions, even after the total contributions had 
exceeded its reservation price. In the meantime, the FC was able to set things right, i.e. to correct 
for initial planning mistakes and, despite a one-year delay and significant extra costs, make the 
project a success that all parties – albeit tacitly – agreed had been worth paying the higher price 
for.  
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Discussion 
The preceding section provides a first empirical test of the expectations developed in the theory 
section by studying salami tactics in two very different cases. A comparison of the two cases 
provides a number of insights about salami tactics and their use during the implementation of 
large-scale public projects. First, the cases reveal that salami tactics are a versatile instrument 
in the tug-of-war over the public perception of a project, as they are applicable to both delays 
and cost overruns. While salami tactics in the BER case worked primarily on the time 
dimension, through the stepwise delay of the opening date, in the Expo.02 case, they worked 
on the cost dimension by gradually increasing the federal contribution. However, in both cases, 
salami tactics fulfilled the same purpose for the politicians overseeing project implementation. 
They made it possible to more credibly deflect responsibility for delays and cost increases and 
made the perceived loss appear more publicly tolerable for longer. Politicians used salami 
tactics to uphold the impression that the project was still on the road to success.  
Second, despite their blame-reducing and blame-deflecting effects, the cases reveal that salami 
tactics are not a panacea for politicians in charge of projects based on overoptimistic forecasts. 
The longer the postponement of the opening date of the BER, the less effective salami tactics 
became, since the public, media and political opponents no longer accorded credibility to the 
mayor’s assurances that the opening of the airport was within reach. Over time, official reports 
and investigative journalism produced ever more information about the severity of the 
underlying problems that rendered the mayor’s justifications increasingly implausible. Also, in 
the case of Expo.02, it is evident that parliament experienced growing mistrust in the FC’s 
assurances that a specific contribution would be the last. These observations suggest that salami 
tactics work less successfully when there is a substantial lapse in time and when there is more 
repetition in their use. The more repeated the application of salami tactics, the higher the 
likelihood that political opponents and the media will become suspicious and that, in-between 
the slicing, information about the real state of the project will become public and diminish the 
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interpretive room to apply salami tactics. If official reports, investigative journalists, or whistle-
blowers, reveal severe problems that cannot be solved easily but persist over time, like the 
inoperable fire protection system in the BER case, salami tactics become particularly difficult 
to apply. When severe problems become public, politicians in charge must stop propagating 
optimism and must instead make major course corrections.  
Third, the cases highlight the methodological difficulties encountered when assessing whether 
stepwise announcements are the result of salami tactics (the claim put forward in this article) 
or of unforeseen developments (the most plausible alternative explanation). Given the high 
complexity of large-scale projects, politicians can usually concoct a variety of reasons that 
justify their faith in a specific opening date or cost estimate, and the researcher must assess the 
substance of each of these alleged reasons. Moreover, as the Expo.02 case suggests, politicians 
can apply salami tactics in an attenuated form. This may be the case when a politician does not 
actively disregard information but knows quite well that considerable optimism still looms 
below the project surface and therefore refrains from making this an object of political 
discussion. Given these complications, it will often be difficult to provide evidence that strongly 
confirms the use of salami tactics. However, the analytical steps proposed above show 
potentially promising ways of combining pieces of evidence. Multiple pieces of evidence can 
add up to considerable affirmative evidence; evidence that decisively weakens the alternative 
explanation that politicians made step-wise announcements to the best of their knowledge 
(Collier 2011).   
Finally, and most importantly, the cases reveal that salami tactics can be hugely consequential 
for the fate of large-scale public projects. In both cases, salami tactics prolonged the resolution 
of underlying problems. For example, the faulty fire protection system in the BER case or poor 
management within the Verein could have been tackled earlier had the politicians not jumped 
to announce that the projects, and their opening dates or costs, were still under control. By 
downplaying problems and risks, salami tactics help to uphold a favourable perception of a 
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project during its implementation. In doing so, salami tactics facilitate a kind of ‘groupthink’ 
that a troubled project is really on track when, in reality, it is not ('t Hart 1994). Salami tactics 
allow project contractors and politicians to ward off critical questions from outsiders and delay 
neutral evaluations of a project’s real state of implementation. The BER case further 
demonstrates that salami tactics, through their effect on acceleration measures and related 
planning mistakes, can become an independent driver of further cost overruns and delays. 
Consequently, salami tactics can lock a project in on a self-undermining path that cements, or 
even increases, the waste of public resources and potentially distorts their allocation to other 
projects (Cantarelli et al. 2010). These observations notwithstanding, I caution against an all 
too negative assessment of the consequences of salami tactics. The Expo.02 case suggests that 
salami tactics can enable politicians to pull through with a project that temporarily encounters 
difficulties but still develops into a widely perceived policy success. Whether salami tactics 
have negative or positive consequences primarily depends on the severity of the problems that 
they help to downplay and prevent from being addressed. If salami tactics prevent or delay the 
addressing of problems that are crucial for a project’s successful implementation, like in the 
BER case, negative consequences will clearly prevail. In these situations, politicians endanger 
implementation success by applying salami tactics. On the contrary, if the (downplayed) 
problems are less severe, as in the Expo.02 case, salami tactics can also become a ‘project 
protection measure’ that saves projects from being killed by short-sighted and overblown 
criticism. 
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes to the understanding of the trajectory of large-scale public projects by 
conceptualising and describing an important blame management strategy used by politicians 
during the implementation of such projects: the stepwise announcement of delays and/or cost 
overruns intended to reduce and deflect the blame emerging for a project that turns out to be 
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more expensive or takes longer to complete than initially communicated. Salami tactics can 
influence the fate of individual projects and the allocation of public resources. The study of 
salami tactics sheds light on two aspects of large-scale public projects that crucially add to our 
understanding of the implementation of such projects: the political framing contests that take 
place when a project’s inflated BCR diminishes and the blame management strategies that 
politicians adopt during these framing contests.  
As the first study that focuses on this hitherto neglected, but important and widely observed, 
blame management strategy, this article offers multiple starting points for future research. With 
regard to salami tactics, it is important to refine our knowledge about their applicability and 
their consequences. This article suggests that salami tactics, while applicable to both cost 
increases and delays, become implausible under certain conditions. If politicians apply them 
over a long time span, political opponents and the media tend to become suspicious, as more 
information about the real state of a project becomes public. This deprives politicians of the 
possibility to continue to frame a project in a positive way. With regard to consequences, salami 
tactics’ influence on cost development and completion times are likely to be especially negative 
if their application helps to cover up severe underlying problems that stand in the way of the 
successful implementation of the project. As these suggestions are based on the analysis and 
comparison of two cases, they must be validated in future empirical work. 
More generally, this article demonstrates the theoretical potential of the literature on policy 
failure and blame management for elucidating the politics surrounding the implementation of 
large-scale public projects. This literature allows to conceptualise the often bumpy 
implementation of large-scale public projects as political framing contests about the dominant 
public perception of these projects. Moreover, the article demonstrates that these framing 
contests can influence the trajectories of such projects. To obtain a more detailed understanding 
of these framing contests and their implications for the fate of policy projects, future research 
should explore the use of other blame management strategies (Hinterleitner 2018; Hood 2011; 
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Mortensen 2016; Boin et al. 2010) during the implementation of these projects. A concrete 
example of the latter is the creation of so called ‘fuzzy’ governance structures (Bache et al. 
2015), which are often found in the organisation of complex projects and which are sometimes 
said to facilitate the diffusion and deflection of blame. Overall, there is a strong case to be made 
for analysing the trajectory of large-scale public projects from a blame management 
perspective. 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1. Case selection criteria and their purposes 
Purpose of the empirical analysis Case selection criterion fulfilling 
the purpose 
Reasoning 
Explore the use of salami tactics 
and test their blame-reducing and 
blame-deflecting effects 
Select two cases with projects based 
on overoptimistic BCRs 
Salami tactics need to be explored in 
cases where they can theoretically occur. 
Overoptimistic projects that attract blame 
during implementation are a precondition 
for the use of salami tactics 
Create further insights on the shape, 
applicability, and consequences of 
salami tactics 
Select two ‘most different’ cases Differences can be leveraged to create 
additional insights on the factors that 
influence the shape, applicability, and 
consequences of salami tactics 
Create as much representativeness 
as possible 
Select two ‘most different’ cases Evidence for the use of salami tactics in 
two very different cases increases the 
likelihood that they occur during the 
implementation of a wide range of 
overoptimistic projects 
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Table A2. Main data and their primary uses 
 Main data analysed for BER case Main data analysed for Expo.02 case Primary use 
Parliamentary 
debates 
Transcripts of debates in the Berlin 
House of Representatives on 3 June 
2010, 10 May 2012, 18 May 2012 
(in the Committee on Building, 
Housing, and Transport), 24 May 
2012, 30 August 2012, 25 October 
2012, 10 January 2013, 16 January 
2014 and 8 May 2014 
Transcripts of debates in the National 
Council (first chamber) on 7 
December 1999, 16 June 2000, 27 
September 2001 and 6 March 2002; 
transcripts of debates in the Council of 
States (second chamber) on 16 
December 1999, 6 June 2000 and 14 
March 2002; written statements by the 
FC towards parliament from 8 October 
1999 and 30 January 2002 
Assessment of 
step-wise 
announcements 
and their 
justification, 
assessment of 
reactions of 
political opponents 
Media coverage 60 articles in ‘Die Welt’ (a leading 
quality paper) and 90 articles in 
‘B.Z.’ (a local paper) between June 
2010 and February 2014  
54 articles in ‘NZZ’ (a leading quality 
paper) and 21 articles in 
‘TagesAnzeiger’ (a local paper) 
between March 1999 and May 2002 
Assessment of 
step-wise 
announcements 
and their 
justification, 
assessment of 
reactions by 
political opponents 
Official and 
expert reports 
Berlin Regional Court, 2014, ruling 
93 O 55/13; Ernest and Young, 
2012, Sachverhaltsdarstellung zu 
Störungen des Projektablaufes und 
deren Auswirkungen 
Swiss Federal Audit Office, 2005, 
Expo.01/02: Auftrag mit 
unbeschränkter Haftung: 
Sonderuntersuchung zur 
Landesausstellung im Drei-Seen-Land; 
Rieder, S., et al., 2004, Analyse der 
Projektorganisation und 
Projektsteuerung der Expo.01/02: 
Bericht zuhanden der Eidgenössischen 
Finanzkontrolle EFK; Control 
Committee Council of States, 2001, 
Probleme bei der Vorbereitung und 
Organisation der Landesausstellung 
2001 (Expo.01). Eine Aufarbeitung im 
Rahmen der parlamentarischen 
Oberaufsicht 
Gauge of level of 
information 
politicians possess 
when announcing 
cost 
overruns/delays 
Note: I retrieved relevant articles from the abovementioned newspapers via the Factiva database using several case-specific 
keywords. Moreover, I occasionally consulted (and cite in the text) articles from other outlets in case they could provide further 
insights into the cases (e.g. pieces of investigative journalism). All other documents are available from the author upon request. 
 
 
